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men's Act is concurrent with the state compensation act, he need
not pursue a costly appeal merely to find out which act applies
to him, but can simply choose between the two without fear of
having made the wrong choice. 4 5
C. Jerre Lloyd
CRIMINAL LAW- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE PROHIBITING
POSSESSION OF HYPODERMIC NEEDLE WITHOUT CRIMINAL INTENT
Defendant was convicted under a Louisiana statute' making
it a crime to possess a hypodermic needle. The statute, with cer-
tain exceptions, 2 imposed criminal liability for mere possession
with no consideration given to the intended use of the needle. In
the original trial3 the state introduced evidence of the presence
of a barbiturate in the box where the needle was found. Defend-
ant offered evidence to prove that he had never used the needle
for the administration of narcotics. The state's objection of
irrelevancy to this offer was sustained in the district court on
the grounds that the defendant was being prosecuted for pos-
session alone, and intent was therefore irrelevant. On appeal,
the case was remanded by the Supreme Court on the grounds
that evidence tending to show an illegal intent and evidence
tending toward disproving this intent are both relevant in all
criminal prosecutions. 4 On retrial, the defendant was again con-
victed, with the evidentiary matter apparently never again be-
coming an issue. On appeal of the second conviction, the de-
the Longshoremen's Act and the applicable state act. See Hahn v. Ross Island
Sand & Gravel Co., 79 S.Ct. 266 (U.S. 1959) (employer subjected to negligence
suit resulting from failure to participate in state compensation plan even though
employer was covered under the Longshoremen's Act).
45. A comparison of the benefits under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act with those under the Longshoremen's Act can be found in MALONE, Lou-
ISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 606-12 (1951). For a
short discussion of the possibility of obtaining awards under both the Louisiana
act and the federal act, see note 39 8upra.
1. LA. R.S. 40:962(B) (1950) : "It is unlawful for any person, except a
dealer in surgical instruments, apothecary, dentist, veterinarian or nurse, attend-
ant or intern of a hospital, sanatorium or institution in which persons are treated
for disability or disease, at any time to have or possess a hypodermic syringe or
needle unless such possession be authorized by the prescription or certificate of a
physician issued within the period of one year prior thereto. Provided that this
sub-section shall not be held to apply to syringes or needles for the treatment of
fowl or livestock." The term "physician" is defined to mean a person authorized
to practice medicine in the State of Louisiana.
2. Ibid.
3. State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957).
4. See note 16 infra.
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fendant pleaded the unconstitutionality of the statute under the
Federal Constitution. On rehearing, held, conviction reversed.
A statute that imposes criminal liability through a creation of
an irrebuttable presumption of guilt based on mere possession of
an instrument used essentially for useful and necessary purposes
is violative of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
State v. Birdsell, 235 La. 396, 104 So.2d 148 (1953).
Generally, a criminal statute will not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution unless the statute is so unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious as to shock the conscience. 5 Two of the
more specific considerations involved in such a determination
are whether the objective of the statute is necessary to the pub-
lic welfare6 and whether the means provided by the statute are
effective in achieving this end.7 Another specific consideration
of due process is the general requirement that there must be
scienter, or criminal intent, before action can be punished as
criminal.8 Certain exceptions to this rule exist, and where the
public interest is very great and the potentiality of serious in-
jury is large, no criminal intent is required. Thus under pure
food and drug laws the offender need not have criminal intent
nor even knowledge of the commission of the prohibited act.9
Criminal intent is not a required element of either sex offenses
against juveniles 10 or of narcotics violations." If the penalty for
the crime which requires no criminal intent is greatly dispro-
portionate to the evil to be suppressed, unconstitutionality may
5. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
6. In Shevlin-Carpenter v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910), the protection of
state lands was deemed sufficiently necessary to warrant such a statute.
7. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the statute requiring felons
to register with the police was considered ineffective in combatting recidivistic
crimes. Rather, it seemed merely a means of harassment. See also Note, 18
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 726 (1958) for a discussion of this case.
8. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) ; United States v. Brunett,
53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931) ; United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D.
Ky. 1939).
9. Carolene Products v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) ; United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922); Barnes v. United States, 142 F.2d 648 (9th
Cir. 1944).
10. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950). The offender cannot set up as a defense, lack of
knowledge of the victim's age, so upon proof of commission of the act, no criminal
intent must be proven. See also id. 14:42(3), 14:81.
11. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (defendant was convicted
under a statute prohibiting sale of narcotics. Court held that no intent or knowl-
edge was required in the statute and that it was not a violation of due process).
See also United States v. Berhman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) ("If the offense be
a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the in-
dictment need not charge such knowledge or intent").
[Vol. XIX
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result. 2 It is to be observed that in sex offenses against juve-
niles and narcotics violations, greater punishment is generally
provided for than in the area of pure food and drug laws. The
statutes are nevertheless constitutional in view of the propor-
tionality of the greater punishment to the greater evil. Also, in
sex and narcotics violations the act is so inherently evil that it
may be said that the offender knew or should have known that
his action was against the accepted standards of conduct of
society, and a severe penalty is justified. Nevertheless, because
of the seriousness of the punishment imposed, the offender must
do a knowing act, whereas in the pure food laws, the punishment
is comparatively so slight that an unknowing act may be
punished.' 3
It should be noted that the above considerations are relative
and not absolute factors in determining whether a statute satis-
fies due process requirements.14
By its inclusion in the Narcotics Act,' 5 the objective of the
statute in the instant case is apparently to control the use of
narcotics. Such an end would seem quite necessary to protect
the public welfare. Also the punishment of persons who merely
possess syringes would seem to be an effective means of appre-
hending narcotics addicts in view of the fact that syringes are
commonly used to administer drugs. However, since many neces-
sary and useful purposes are served by syringes, the court
seemed to feel that the statute was so unreasonable as to out-
weigh any necessity of protecting the public from narcotics
users. Another factor which apparently influenced the court
was the fact that a person merely possessing an innocuous ob-
ject could be subjected to a severe punishment even though that
12. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 7, § 5 (1957), for a discussion of pro-
portionality of punishment.
13. See note 9 supra.
14. Compare, e.g., Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910)
and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). In the Minnesota case a statute
which did not require criminal intent was upheld, whereas in the California case
the absence of a criminal intent element caused the statute to be unconstitutional.
The California ordinance punished felons for a mere failure to register, whereas
the Minnesota statute punished the taking of state timber, even though the taking
occurred under a good faith belief that a valid permit had been granted. The
Supreme Court in the Minnesota case was impressed with the necessity and ef-
fectiveness of the statute in preventing the theft of state timber. However, in the
California case,-since public records contained lists of local ex-convicts, the Court
was neither impressed with the effectiveness of the statute in protecting the public
from criminal recidivism nor the necessity of requiring local felons to register.
15. LA. R.S. 40:962 (1950) is similar to the Uniform Narcotics Act, and
contains provisions prohibiting possession of hypodermic needles and syringes.
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person had no criminal intent. Apparently, if the statute haa
required criminal intent as an element of the crime, the court
would have found it constitutional. Where the intent element is
necessary to the constitutionality of a statute, and the statute
on its face does not require intent, the court is faced with al-
ternatives. The statute may be declared unconstitutional, or it
may be interpreted as requiring the requisite intent. On appeal
of the original trial, the court seemed to read in an intent ele-
ment.16 However, on appeal of the second trial the court applied
the statute as written and declared it unconstitutional. 17 It might
appear that in the case of State v. Johnson,8 involving a convic-
tion for possession of narcotics, the court read in an intent re-
quirement. It is submitted that the court there read in a require-
ment that the offender knowingly possess the narcotics. 9
16. The holding of the court on the appeal of the first trial ot State v. Birdsell,
232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957) and the holding of the instant decision appear
at first glance to be in conflict. In the first trial, the defendant had offered evi-
dence tending to prove the absence of an intent to use the syringe for criminal
purposes. The state's objection to the relevancy and admissibility of such evi-
dence was sustained, although objections by the defense to evidence introduced by
the prosecution to show the presence of a criminal intent were overruled. Con-
sidering only the bill of exceptions which was taken to the sustaining of the
state's objection, the Supreme Court stated that evidence relating to intent was
relevant and admissible whether introduced by the defendant or the prosecutiom
The rationale was that in order to -be constitutional a criminal statute must con-
tain a criminal intent element as a part of the proscribed conduct. In view of
this, it was reasonable to conclude that the court had read the requisite intent
element into the statute. See Note, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 340 (1958).
However, it is submitted that such a conclusion is incorrect and that therefore
the earlier decision and the instant decision are compatible. The validity of the
statute had not been put in question in the first decision. The court was merely
considering an evidentiary question and it would have been grossly unfair to pre-
clude the defendant from introducing evidence to rebut the evidence as to criminal
intent which the state had been allowed to introduce. Apparently the court, al-
though it did not expressly state that it was so doing, presumea that the statute
was valid in the absence of any attack upon its constitutionality. See Barber v.
Louisiana By. & Nay. Co., 141 La. 1059, 76, So. 199 (1917). Therefore, the court
must have reasoned that any evidence relating to criminal intent was relevant
because, under the presumption of constitutionality, the statute would contain all
constitutional requirements. However, in the instant opinion, the court was
squarely faced with an attack upon the constitutionality of the statute and had to
consider not what the statute presumably contained, but whether it actually con-
tained the requisites for validity.
17. See note 16 supra.
18. 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955). On trial for unlawiul possession of
narcotics, evidence of a subsequent offense was admitted over defendant's objection
to prove guilty knowledge. Defendant appealed on the grounds that guilty knowl-
edge or intent was not a required element of the offense and that admission of
the evidence was reversible error. Court held that evidence tending to prove that
the defendant did "knowingly possess" was relevant because such possession was
necessary to support a conviction.
19. See note 18 aupra. This case was predicated largely on rules of evidence.
However, it will be noted that after going into an extensive discussion of intent
requirements, the court adopted the: term knowledge rather than intent. It was
held that guilty knowledge was necessary .in order for there to be unlawful pos-
session. There has been much disagreement about what kind of knowledge the
NOTES
There is a great probability when narcotics are in the pos-
session of a layman that they will be used for criminal purposes.
Therefore, knowing possession of narcotics is sufficient to im-
pute the requisite criminal intent element.20 Actual criminal in-
tent is not a required element for the constitutionality of any
criminal statute which proscribes conduct which an offender
should reasonably anticipate as having criminal consequences.
2 1
A criminal intent may be imputed to such conduct. However, a
criminal intent cannot be imputed from the knowing possession
of a hypodermic syringe because of the object's many ordinary
and innocent uses.
The difficulty in securing narcotics convictions under stat-
utes requiring that the offender be found with drugs in his
possession is quite evident since normally narcotics are held in
small portions which are easily disposed of. Therefore, statutes
such as the one in the instant case offer a valuabie means where-
by narcotics violators can be convicted. The problem is to avoid
punishing innocent persons who possess hypodermic syringes
for legal purposes, and with no intention to use for narcotic
purposes. It is submitted that the conflicting considerations of
ease in prosecution and protection of the innocent can be com-
promised by re-enacting this statute so as to create a rebuttable
presumption of criminal intent based on mere possession. This
approach has been employed in narcotics legislation, as well as
legislation against the possession of burglars' tools, 22 articles
court required in this case, whether it required knowledge of possession of the
article alone, or knowledge of the fact of possession of the article as well as of
its narcotic content. It seems that the latter is the correct view, for .mere knowl-
edge that one is possessing an article with no knowledge of the narcotic content
would not seem to create guilty knowledge as the court required. Such knowledge
would not, by the analysis here presented, result in constitutionality. Also, from
the emphasis that the court placed on the term "unlawful possession," it seems
that such possession would be found only in the absence of any lawful use, such
as use under the direction of a physician. See Note, 17 LousliANA LAW REVIEW
229 (1956).
20. "In the recent case of State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24, we held
that unlawful possession, where one is invested with some right of dominion, can
-be defined as a possession which in the ordinary course of human experience
necessarily involves knowledge of the fact that one is possessing either rightfully
or unlawfully as well as with knowledge of the criminal consequences which one
should reasonably anticipate therefrom." (Emphasis added.) State v. Birdsell,
232 La. 725, 729, 95 So.2d 290, 291 (1957).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. State v. Smith, 247 Iowa 500, 73 N.W.2d 189 (1955) (here it was held
that the finding of burglary tools in the defendant's car constituted a prima face
case against the defendant) ; Benton v. United States, 232 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (it was held -that a presumption of guilt from the fact of possession, if the
possession was not explained satisfactorily, was permissible); Yce Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (court held that a statute making possession of nar-
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equally as innocent in nature as are hypodermic syringes, and it
eases the burden of prosecution by placing the burden of proving
innocent intention on the possessor.
Lamar E. Ozley, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - INTOXICATION AND SPECIFIC INTENT
IN HOMICIDE PROSECUTION
In a prosecution for murder' there was evidence that the de-
fendants had been drinking intoxicants shortly before the shoot-
ing. The trial judge charged the jury that voluntary intoxica-
tion could never be a defense to a crime2 and refused to instruct
the jury that they could consider the voluntary intoxication of
those defendants who had not actually fired the gun insofar as
intoxication might bear on whether or not they are principals. 3
On appeal of the conviction, held, reversed. Although the charge
requested by the defendants was improper, the charge given by
the judge was incomplete and constituted reversible error, for it
denied the defendants "the right to have the jury pass on the
factual question of whether they were in such an intoxicated con-
dition as to preclude the presence of a specific criminal intent. ' '4
State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689 (La. 1958).
The Louisiana Criminal Code provides that criminal intent
may be either general or specific and defines specific criminal
intent as "that state of mind which exists when the circum-
stances indicate that the offender actively desired the proscribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." 5 The
cotics sufficient to support a presumption of knowledge, unless defendant could
explain or rebut such presumption, was constitutional).
1. LA. R.S. 14:30(1) (1950) : "Murder is the killing of a human being, (1)
When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."
Felony murder defined in clause (2) of this article is not applicable to this situa-
tion.
2. State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689, 690 (La. 1958) : "I charge you further
that voluntary intoxication is no defense under the law for having committed a
crime while so intoxicated."
3. Ibid. Trial judge refused the following charge requested by defendants:
"However, a partial or total intoxication may be considered by you in weighing
the behavior and conduct of the defendants as you may find were not guilty of
actually triggering the weapon that killed [the deceased], insofar as such behavior
or conduct may bear on whether or not they were aiders, abetters, counsellors, or
procurers."
4. Id. at 691.
5. LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1950). Clause (2) of this article defines general intent
as being present "whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circum-
stances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience,
[Vol. XIX
